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were inaccessible. Mr. Haile apparently suffers from the same misfortune, though one discovers the fact only by going through his notes. This situation is unfortunate. What is more perplexing to both readers and contemplating writers than a scholarly book which says not quite the last word?

Mr. Lang's chief interest was to vindicate James's character. He blames Thackeray's *Esmond* for the need of such defense, and in a brilliant passage (p. vii) declares that Thackeray's picture is "merely an unconscious reproduction . . . of Scott's chapters on Charles II., a fugitive sheltered at Woodstock after Worcester fight". It may be added that many persons confuse the two "pretenders", and visit the son's misdeeds upon the father. Scholars have, of course, escaped these errors, but for everybody the high integrity of James's character is now established. Nevertheless, not even Miss Shield can acquit him of ungenerous conduct during his engagement to Clementina Sobieska, whom he seemed quite ready to jilt at the very moment when she was risking everything for him. In their later troubles, the chief blame is rightly laid on Clementina. If James's temperament was difficult, hers was impossible, and it was absolutely necessary to exclude her from political affairs.

Detailed criticism of a long story of intrigue is obviously here impossible. One can only say that James's personal career is well set forth; that the pulling and hauling of Jacobite plotters, though narrated with some confusion in details, leave an effective total impression; but that the relations of the cause to general politics, and especially to Scottish politics, are inadequately traced. The best chapters—on James's share in "the 'Fifteen'"—show "his courage and resolution", but also his incapacity to plan or lead a desperate endeavor. On the other hand, the book leaves one almost convinced that this honest, loyal, tolerant and reasonable man would have stood by his guarantees of the church and the laws, and would not have failed in the rôle of a constitutional king.

JOSEPH PARKER WARREN.

England in the Seven Years' War: a Study in Combined Strategy.

In two volumes. By JULIAN S. CORBETT, LL.M., Lecturer in History to the Royal Naval War College. (London and New York: Longmans, Green and Company. 1907. Pp. xi, 476; vii, 407.)

MR. CORBETT's subject has a twofold justification. In the first place we have had hitherto no thoroughly adequate study of that department of the war which directly affected the destinies of three nations and three continents; and secondly, we are treated for the first time to an intimate appreciation of how Pitt really conducted it. It is not enough that judging from results we call Pitt an organizer of victory. Mr.

Corbett shows us exactly how brain and brawn accomplished those results.

Naturally a book with a limited object, such as this, labors under certain disadvantages. Mr. Corbett seldom allows us to look over French shoulders; and merely to study how one nation played the great game is dangerously conducive to distorted impressions. Very clearly are we shown that France's policy of the "naval defensive" was a largely determining factor in the issue as well as the character of the war; and Mr. Corbett believes rightly that to seek compensation in Germany for inevitable losses in America was, under the circumstances, excellent policy. But what we are apt to forget in reading his book is that the corruption and inefficiency of French administration, and the decline in the personnel of the army were not only the main reasons for the failure of that policy but the conditions which rendered Pitt's achievements possible. Thus while the author's assertion (I. 191) that "to say, as is often said, that his policy was to conquer Canada in America is entirely to misconceive it" is correct as far as it goes, Pitt's actual statement was indirectly true.

But the gravest objection to the book is its bias. It is too much to assert that France's policy of a fortified barrier in America was based on "fine-drawn arguments that had no real foundation (I. 12)". It would be more just to remain content with the admission that "the stubborn commercial spirit", later mentioned (I. 14), rendered a diplomatic arrangement almost impossible. Again, to overlook the sweeping demands of the British cabinet and write of an ultimatum in which "France gaily claimed the whole of the disputed territory" (I. 40) is to convey an erroneous impression of the whole negotiation. In dealing with Boscawen's blow in 1755, Mr. Corbett is almost ingenuous. "It would be only charitable", he declares (I. 67), "to remember the temptation to which she [England] was exposed by the incredible simplicity of her adversary." Then if we turn to his discussion of the Spanish question of 1761, we find him naïvely stating (II. 207) that "one more such attempt could hardly have given us a worse reputation". He is perhaps presenting the best excuse when he appeals to British precedent as justification for a secret blow (I. 46); but even here it is to be remembered that a negotiation for a peaceful settlement was still pending when the cabinet resolved upon Boscawen's instructions. The episode is, of course, one on which Continental writers almost invariably disagree with their British neighbors. But when Mr. Corbett writes that the English ministers were "playing the great game of war, and playing it correctly" (I. 46), he substitutes a "might-is-right" proposition for the broader question of when and how a war may properly begin. And this leads us to remark incidentally that Mr. Corbett's profound sense of strategy blinds him to the greatest merit which diplomacy possesses. "Every consideration", he writes (I. 3), "of diplomatic . . . operations must rest subservient to naval strategy."

Correct as this may be, strategically, and true as it is that international relations possessed little of the sanctity of legal regulation, the irresistible feeling that they were playing a dangerous hand was at the bottom of much of the English council's vacillation over Hawke. Throughout his treatment of foreign policy and the evolution of the war Mr. Corbett's historical judgment seems warped by his patriotism. We may question whether the strategic foresight with which he credits the Newcastle ministry (I. 83, 140) is evinced by any statement in the ministers' letters; and it is hard to endorse his estimate of Hardwicke (I. 33) if he were really, as the author alleges (I. 50-51), "the dominating brain of the administration". Equally strange is his high praise of Cumberland (I. 33) in view of the latter's record and appointments; and Anson's weighty contribution to the Minorca disaster (I. 134-135) is no less to be remembered than his subsequent success in redeeming himself. Mr. Corbett gives, in fact, the impression of wishing to rehabilitate the Newcastle administration without finding much justification for it himself. Rather than own frankly that many of these ministers proved their worth only after a man appeared at the helm who could stimulate and drive them, he struggles in vain against the contrast which most historians find in the conduct of the war before and after Pitt's elevation. Whether it be true or not that the project of invasion was anything more than a well-reasoned feint, Mr. Corbett certainly fails to exculpate Newcastle from neglect of Minorca. Later we find the author himself acknowledging (I. 102) that "the line of passage from Toulon ought to have been seized earlier", and he shows in the same connection how Newcastle for political reasons diminished the navy. Yet with all his negligence and vacillation Newcastle was not guilty in Mr. Corbett's opinion of "inability to grasp the situation" (I. 37)! Fortunately we have the author's own strictures—at a later period—on which we may base a more consistent estimate.

Mr. Corbett's enunciation of the broad outlines of Pitt's "system" (I. 187-191) are very instructive. Throughout his book the author's grasp of strategy compels our admiration. He vindicates Pitt's coastal operations from adverse criticism and shows in each case the object they were intended to attain and how well in general the policy worked. One exception which perhaps may strike the reader is the case of the Rochfort project, which Pitt carried through even after Cumberland's defeat, and against the soberer judgment of his colleagues. Since Richelieu's nervousness and the state of his army were all that tided England and Prussia over a very grave crisis, it is hard to resist the feeling that Pitt's decision was perilous. Indeed the fact that he himself appreciated the situation may be seen in his offer to cede Gibraltar to Spain—an important negotiation, which Mr. Corbett omits. Whether or when Pitt's policies were affected by political considerations is a question which Mr. Corbett refrains from discussing.

One of the most interesting features of the book is the description

of the British efforts to gain Canada and of how two of the three attempts were frustrated by the French policy of the naval defensive. Another feature of interest is the writer's criticism of commanders who failed. He acquits Loudoun of blame in the Louisbourg miscarriage and lays the responsibility upon the home-government (vol. I. ch. vii.); he defends Conflans's conduct at Quiberon (II. 57, 61-62); and he seems also to justify Montcalm's precipitate attack on the Plains of Abraham (I. 470-471). The idea that the latter "could not tell how large was the force before him" (I. 470) is a plausible explanation based probably on Admiral Holmes's assertion, quoted by Mr. Doughty. Among the new evidence adduced in the book we note particularly the cabinet minutes of 1755 and the citations from the Viri-Solar correspondence; while American readers will take peculiar interest in the letter which reveals Bedford's prophetic reasoning (II. 173).

In general it may be urged that Mr. Corbett is inclined to be weak wherever he leaves the beaten track of strategy and naval war. Perhaps the scholarly treatment of his main theme is that which makes defects in the political and diplomatic background the more patent. He shows, nevertheless, a clear understanding of constitutional questions, and his discussion of Pitt's downfall (II. 205-206) is admirable. In his treatment of Choiseul's first overtures Mr. Corbett differs considerably from M. Waddington, who believes in their sincerity; but it is difficult to see why if Pitt "wished to unmask the Franco-Spanish game" (II. 155), he could not best have done so by promptly accepting the proffered conditions. The author probably reaches the truth when he points out that Pitt's aim was to destroy entirely the sea-power of France (II. 143); hence his insistence upon her exclusion from the fisheries, and hence his general attitude toward the peace. Mr. Corbett argues also that Pitt might well have pacified Spain by a timely policy of conciliation (II. 207). On the whole it would seem that when people began to desire peace, the rôle of the great war minister had properly come to an end. We might suggest that Mr. Corbett's judgment of Pitt's and Newcastle's "loyalty to Frederick" should have been tempered somewhat by the results of Dr. von Ruville's researches; whereas his view of Bute is on the whole more convincing than that taken by the German scholar.

Despite some defects in style and a few grammatical errors the book is entertainingly written, and, as "a study in combined strategy", is excellent. While in certain respects it needs to be read with caution, the student will find it a valuable companion-piece to M. Waddington's depiction of the Continental phases of the struggle.

T. W. RIKER.